Reading List: Primary Endosymbiosis

3 05 2013

This morning, I was tasked with leading an e-discussion session for a colleague’s MSc. botany course in the UK, by Skype. It lasted around 1.5 hours, the students were fairly hardy. Topic was primary endosymbiosis, which is the process of engulfing a bacterium and incorporating it into the cell, a process most famous for having occurred at the origin of plants when their last common ancestor nommed a free-living cyanobacterium and kept it as a pet. This might seem like far out of my own fields of interest, but the detection of such things is a phylogenetic issue and thus falls under my purview, hence why the colleague asked me to do this.

The following is all the papers that we discussed. Reading them all should give you a very good idea on how primary endosymbioses happen, how they’re maintained, and how we detect them.

Download a .zip of all the PDFs, or click on the individual PDF links after each citation. Order is alphabetical, not by importance.





Phenotypic Plasticity

2 05 2013

daphniaSome organisms can change their appearance, physiology, and development in response to changes in the environment. This is called phenotypic plasticity, and some examples of phenotypically plastic organisms include the Junonia octavia butterflies described in my natural selection lecture, or water fleas that develop a spiny helmet in the presence of predators, as shown in the picture above (left: exposed to predators; right: same species and sex, not exposed to predators; source: Agrawal (2001)). More mundane examples include the changes experienced by bodybuilding humans, or even the effect of learning on the brain – it’s a ubiquitous phenomenon, but here I’ll only be concentrating on the sort of phenotypic plasticity that leads to set phenotypes: bodybuilders have complete control over their muscle sizes and a genius can atrophy their brain at will, but Junonia octavia can only be blue or orange, nothing else.

The most phenotypically plastic organisms are plants. Unlike animals, plants are forced to stay put and must weather any and all conditions thrown at them by the environment with no option of an immediate migration or a run for shelter. Hence, they’ve evolved to be plastic in their physiology and development, with the best example of this being heterophylly, the ability of many wetland plants to change leaf structure and physiology in drought and in flood conditions (hetero = different; phylly = related to leaf).

How do such things work? A genotype is not a blueprint and what results as a final form is the product of both hardwired developmental processes combined with the effect of external factors such as temperature, interactions, or nutrition. Look at the examples I named above: the butterflies develop their colours in response to temperature; the water fleas in response to predators; the plants in response to abiotic changes. These do not somehow trigger sudden reversible mutations, but the culmination of their physiological effects enable the crossing of a threshold, called the reaction norm, which leads to different genes getting turned on and off, leading eventually to the modified phenotypes.

Intuitively, we can guess at how such mechanisms can evolve: they allow the organism to adapt to varying conditions in real-time, potentially allowing for an optimal phenotype for every condition rather than have to settle for one phenotype for that may just be average in most conditions. But such intuitions are not scientifically sound, merely thoughts. A look through the history of phenotypic plasticity research shows two divergent lines of thought:

  • Phenotypic plasticity evolves as stated above, by selecting for complete phenotypes and hardwired reaction norms. This view can be seen fully-formulated as early as Via & Lande (1985).
  • There are gene regulation mechanisms that respond to changing environmental conditions, and these regulatory mechanisms and they genes they affect are what are selected for in the evolution of phenotypic plasticity. In other words, the capacity to be plastic, not the end product of the plasticity, is selected for. Arguments for this view and evidence for such genes can be found as early as Pigliucci (1996).

The reality is that both of these views are valid. The second point describes genotype by environment interactions (GxE interactions), and treats phenotypic plasticity as a trait in and of itself. Since all traits evolve, the second point is valid almost by definition, and this is reflected in the ubiquity of phenotypic plasticity as noted at the end of the first paragraph in this post.

However, it’s also true that some plasticities are set, for example the Junonia octavia butterflies with the blue and orange morphs for the different seasons. Such cases are evidence for the first point, and are collected as a special type of phenotypic plasticity called adaptive phenotypic plasticity: the product of the plasticity provides a distinct advantage, and so it’s set that whenever specific conditions arise, the track towards the alternative phenotype is embarked upon.

The practical significance of phenotypic plasticity shouldn’t be underestimated. As an example, plants, the most phenotypically plastic of all, will probably be relying on that capacity to get through global warming (Valladares et al., 2007). Thankfully, phenotypic plasticity is one of the larger areas of current research from developmental biology, ecology, and evolution.

pigliucci_book

For more on phenotypic plasticity, the eponymous 2001 book by Pigliucci, Phenotypic Plasticity: Beyond Nature and Nurture, may be old and somewhat outdated, but still a useful reference. I also forgot while writing this that I’ve already written a post on phenotypic plasticity, but at least it does take on a different tack…

References:

Agrawal AA. 2001. Phenotypic Plasticity in the Interactions and Evolution of Species. Science 294, 321-326.

Pigliucci M. 1996. How organisms respond to environmental changes: from phenotypes to molecules (and vice versa). TrEE 11, 168-173.

Valladares F, Gianoli E & Gómez JM. 2007. Ecological limits to plant phenotypic plasticity. New Phytologist 176, 749-763.

Via S & Landa R. 1985. Genotype-Environment Interaction and the Evolution of Phenotypic Plasticity. Evolution 39, 505-522.





How did sperm and egg evolve?

1 05 2013

Sex comes at a large cost: a sexual female is only half as fertile as an asexual individual, because the sexual female has to divide her offspring into males and females. So when an asexual organism can produce 50 offspring capable of reproducing, the sexual one can only produce 25, since the males and females have to pair. This is called the double cost of sex.

It’s a situation that’s made more complicated by anisogamy: different-sized gametes, like sperm and egg. This results in the two sexes investing different amounts of time and energy into reproduction, with the females usually bearing the brunt of it (e.g. gestation period), meaning that besides the double cost of sex, they also have this additional cost to pay in reproduction.

These two factors lie behind a lot of very interesting evolutionary biology. In this post, we’ll look at gamete sizes and how anisogamy evolves.

The state before anisogamy, when gametes are of equal size, is called isogamy. Isogamous species include those in the multicellular colonial green alga Volvox. Species here form colonies of different sizes, and there is one trend that’s very noticeable. In those species that produce small colonies, the gametes are of equal size. In species with large colonies, the gametes are separated into two types: one small, mobile gamete, and a large, non-moving gamete (Knowlton, 1974) – just like sperm and egg. In other words, anisogamy is correlated with colony size.

A generalised explanation for the evolution of such a trend is provided by Bulmer & Parker (2002). The key thing to realise is that the ultimate role of gametes is to provide enough nutrients and support for the embryo that they will become. Isogametes vary slightly in size – and whenever you have variation, you can have evolution wedging through. A larger gamete means an offspring that’s better provided for, leading to selection for larger gametes. However, this selection leads indirectly to selection on smaller gametes, since those can move faster and reach other gametes more quickly. Overall, this leads to divergent selection, with the extremes being selected for:

  • Large gametes are slow, therefore can’t fertilise each other; but they provide much better for the offspring.
  • Small gametes are quick and can get to the large gametes earlier; but they provide very little provisioning for the offspring.

The middle ground disappears, and we are left with this stark dimorphism, as seen with sperm and egg.

References:

Bulmer MG & Parker GA. 2002. The evolution of anisogamy: a game-theoretic approach. Proc. R. Soc. B 269, 2381-2388.

Knowlton N. 1974. A note on the evolution of gamete dimorphism. Journal of Theoretical Biology 46, 283-285.





Fluctuating selection, canalisation, and evolvability: Why macroevolution is not “microevolution writ large”

30 04 2013

One of my biggest pet peeves is when people say that macroevolution is just “microevolution writ large”; this is a common saying especially among the creationist-debunkers to counter the claim that microevolution happens but macroevolution doesn’t. It infuriates me to no end, particularly because one of my biggest research goals is to identify the factors affecting the gulf between micro- and macroevolution, or why short-term microevolutionary changes do not accumulate to fixated and exhibited macroevolutionary changes.

And I’m not the only one who does this research, as this remains one of the most open questions in evolutionary biology (Arnold et al., 2001). Part of the problem is that environments change all the time, and with them change the selective optima – what may be the most fit phenotype at one point in time might be the most unfit several generations later. The leads to a pattern of fluctuating selection, where the optimal phenotype(s) change every so often.

Fluctuating selection is generally agreed on as a factor in the evolution of evolvability (Wagner & Altenberg, 1996), the ability to maintain a high rate of microevolution, which in turn is dependent on the concept of canalisation first espoused by Waddington (1942). While he was talking about it in terms of development and evo-devo, we co-opt it in this discussion to talk about population genetics, since that’s the framework for microevolution. Wagner et al. (1997) define it under this framework as an effect leading to the lessening of the effect of mutations.

In other words, by decreasing canalisation, you increase evolvability, since evolvability demands the ability to produce new effectual mutations (Moreno, 1994). This then links back to fluctuating selection because in order to respond to a regime where the optimal phenotype changes constantly, higher evolvability and less canalisation is needed. Studies show exactly this: under fluctuating selection, decanalisation alleles and polymorphic genes become selected for (Kawecki, 2000), i.e. evolvability rises as expected.

An analogous way to consider this is by thinking about how parasites and other highly-specialised organisms (highly-canalised organisms) tend to reach evolutionary dead-ends, while generalists can always specialise further (highly evolvable).

That analogy brings us back to the phenotype and the bridge to macroevolution. Consider that microevolutionary changes, over many generations, are basically subject to cycles of fluctuating selection. If we generalise that fluctuating selection leads to higher evolvability and thus a higher amount of effective mutations, that means that the genotypes generated by generations of microevolution are geared towards producing variability, which then translates to a higher diversity of phenotypes. This is why we can’t say that macroevolution is microevolution writ large: by doing so, we imply that macroevolution is canalised by microevolution, when microevolution does not undergo canalisation except under strict and consistent selectionist regimes.

And even then, the implication that the genotype is a precise blueprint for a single morphology is false, since it ignores the various filters put in place by development and phenotypic plasticity. So, in all, please don’t say that microevolution is equal to macroevolution. They’re different fields (and they’re taught separately: any good evolution program will have a specific course on macroevolution and another on microevolution), they involve different phenomena, and the process of evolution is different at both levels. This is why we talk of a bridge between micro- and macroevolution: there is a chasm to be crossed. Macroevolution is not merely the magnified version of microevolution.

References:

Arnold SJ, Pfender ME & Jones AG. 2001. The adaptive landscape as a conceptual bridge between micro- and macroevolution. Genetica 112-112, 9-32.

Kawecki TJ. 2000. The evolution of genetic canalization under fluctuating selection. Evolution 54, 1-12.

Moreno G. 1994. Genetic Architecture, Genetic Behavior, and Character Evolution. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 25, 31-44.

Waddington CH. 1942. Canalization of development and the inheritance of acquired characters. Nature 150, 563-565.

Wagner GP & Altenberg L. 1996. Perspective: Complex Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability. Evolution 50, 967-976.

Wagner GP, Booth G & Bagheri-Chaichian H. 1997. A Population Genetic Theory of Canalization. Evolution 51, 329-347.





François Jacob (1920-2013)

22 04 2013
François Jacob. Source.

François Jacob. Source.

François Jacob (1920-2013) is pretty much a household name for biologists. He was a French molecular biologist who was one of the three 1965 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine winners (the other two were André Lwoff and Jacques Monod). Monod and Jacob got it for their work on the lac operon, which laid down the foundations for the study of the mechanisms behind gene regulation and expression. He died 3 days ago. Carl Zimmer already has an excellent article on him, but it doesn’t hurt to help spread his legacy around. I’m sure many of the obituaries will concentrate on the molecular biology he is most famous for, so I want to take a different tack and discuss his contribution to evolution through his highly-influential 1977 Science paper, Evolution and tinkering.

In it, he introduced the world to the concept of gene co-option. Co-option of morphological traits had been well-known, but it was Jacob who showed that “evolutionary tinkering” can occur also at the genetic level, with old genes being repurposed to serve new functions.

Jacob’s envisioning of how this would work stems from his previous work on gene expression and regulation. Instead of requiring completely new genes to produce novel morphologies, genes can simply be controlled by regulator genes. These can have slight changes in activity, which results in the target genes being switched on and off at different times during development, leading to new morphologies at the end. If the new morphologies are successful, then the new pattern of regulatory gene activity is automatically selected for, and the new morphology is retained.

In other words, an important source of morphological novelty can come from evolution “tinkering” with pre-existing systems. It’s similar to cooking: if you’re frying a piece of chicken, adding onions at the start of the frying, in the middle, or at the end of the frying will produce very different flavours (burned vs. caramelised vs. raw). Similarly, if your regulatory gene does its thing at the 4-cell stage, at the start of gastrulation, or the start of neurulation, the end result will be pretty different in each case. Of course, things are more complex in real life, since location and co-interactions also come into play, but I’m simplifying to illustrate the point.

The existence of such mechanisms is now routine knowledge, and examples are present in any evolution and developmental biology textbook, as it’s an important concept for evo-devo.

He did go a bit too far in arguing his case when he claimed that “the probability that a functional protein would appear de novo by random association of amino acids is practically zero”, which is factually wrong (linked is just one random example). In all fairness though, at time of his writing, it was probably a sensible claim to make since there were no examples, so we can’t fault him for it.

That paper was also a rather philosophical one on the nature of evolution, and is an excellent text to use against Intelligent Design creationists with its description of how natural selection is constrained by historical contingency, forcing it to work by tinkering rather than by following a preconceived plan as a designer would. It also contains some excellent quotes and passages on the nature of science itself. Here’s one of my favourites:

[Science] operates by detailed experimentation with nature and thus appears less ambitious, at least at first glance. It does not aim at reaching at once a complete and definitive explanation of the whole universe, its beginning, and its present form. Instead, it looks for partial and provisional answers about those phenomena that can be isolated and well defined. Actually, the beginning of modern science can be dated from the time when such general questions as “How was the universe created? What is matter made of? What is the essence of life?” were replaced by such limited questions as “How does a stone fall? How does water flow in a tube? How does blood circulate in vessels?” This substitution had an amazing result. While asking general questions led to limited answers, asking limited questions turned out to provide more and more general answers.

If you want to read more about him, what better way than to read what he wrote himself? He has a very interesting autobiography from 1988, highly-recommended: The Statue Within: An Autobiography.

References:

Jacob F. 1977. Evolution and tinkering. Science 196, 1161-1166.

Jacob F. 1988. The Statue Within: An Autobiography.

Li C-H, Zhang Y, Wang Z, Zhang Y, Cao C, Zhang P-W, Lu S-J, Li X-M, Yu Q, Zheng X, Du Q, Uhl GR, Liu Q-R & Wei L. 2010. A Human-Specific De Novo Protein-Coding Gene Associated with Human Brain Functions. PLoS Computational Biology 6, e1000734.





On Group Selection

13 04 2013

A reader picked up on my parenthesised comment on EO Wilson’s kin selection paper in this post, which led to a substantial e-mail conversation on group selection, which I will distill here to show you that the noise against group selection doesn’t hold much water anymore.

Explaining the existence of altruism has always been one of the central problems of evolution. Altruism is defined as an action that is negative to the actor, and positive for a recipient. Why would an individual organism do something like that? Until the 1960s, group selection – the idea that natural selection can act to benefit groups – was viewed as an ideal candidate, since the positive effect for the group overpowers the negative effect on the individual, leading to that group outcompeting other groups where altruism does not exist. A “group” is nowadays best defined as a population of intercting organisms which affect each other’s fitnesses (Sober & Wilson, 1994).

The staunch opposition to and denial of group selection was popularised in the 1960s with George C. Williams‘s 1966 seminal book, Adaptation and Natural Selection. Among his evidence was that sex ratios in animals are fairly even, whereas group selection would predict biased sex ratios. The entire book consists of him calculating that “group-related adaptations do not, in fact, exist”, because its power would be too weak to influence the power of natural selection on the individual level, since individuals have a much faster turnover rate than groups, thus evolution happens more quickly in them.

Maynard Smith‘s work complemented and expanded on these conlusions (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1976), and he even came up with another alternative to group selection, evolutionary game theory, expounded in his 1982 book Evolution and the Theory of Games. Economists will be aware of game theory; this is the same thing. Behaviour is modelled by seeing the interactions of different individuals. If two altruists interact, the result is positive. If two selfishs interact, the result is negative. If an altruist and a selfish interact, the result is positive for the selfish, negative for the altruist. Therefore, altruism evolves only when altruistic interactions are much more common than selfish interactions. The role of other groups is irrelevant, selection takes place within the group only.

But since then, a lot of research and progress has been made, and group selection has been shown to be possible and even likely, and in my opinion, it is no longer valid to demonise group selection.

I mentioned in my natural selection lecture the classic demonstration of group selection in lab-reared beetles by Wade (1977), which proves that group selection can in fact be a dominant evolutionary force. A valid criticism would be to say that evolution in the lab is too artificial and not reflective of evolutionary forces in the wild.

But in the wild, group selection has also emerged as a favoured explanation for some scenarios. See Heinsohn & Packer (1995) for an example with lions and their territorial defence. The authors set the problem effectively: “If too few females accept the responsibilities of leadership, the territory will be lost. If enough females cooperate to defend the range, their territory is maintained, but their collective effort is vulnerable to abuse by their companions. Leaders do not gain additional benefits from leading, but they do provide an opportunity for laggards to gain a free ride”. The experiments involved changing the conditions slightly, and the diversity and complexity of reactions revealed that just invoking individual selection just wasn’t enough to explain everything; group selection fills the gap.

Even theory and modelling, what initially sounded the death knell for group selection, has recently been turned around to make it a plausible theory again. Models from the 1970s, such as Levin & Kilmer (1974), while adequate for their time, can’t compete with the much more powerful simulations and models computers are capable of today. When a larger multitude of factors is taken into account, group selection does come out as likely. As an example, check out Werfel & Bar-Yam (2004), whose model finds that a reduction in fertility might evolve to avoid resource overconsumption, echoing a classic group selectionist argument (see Borrello’s excellent book, Evolutionary Restraints: The Contentious History of Group Selection).

The opposition to group selection simply does not hold up anymore, since it’s now acknowledged that multilevel selection is the most valid way to look at natural selection, as has been realised since the 1970s. In the 1960s, WD Hamilton developed inclusive fitness theory, now better known as kin selection (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b), which mathematised the advantage of parental care as an individualistic advantage borne out of the positive effect of making sure relatives have a high fitness, since they carry the same genes. This gave birth to the well-known Hamilton’s Rule: rb > c. Altruism can evolve only when genetic relatedness (r) and the benefit (b) are greater than the cost (c). This would explain why eusocial insect colonies, like ants, are all made up of sisters and daughters. This was initially seen as a futher blow to group selection.

However, in the 1970s, Hamilton combined his inclusive fitness theory with the Price equation and noticed that altruistic traits by themselves are disadvantageous, and only become advantageous when dominant in a population. In other words, an individual altruist is useless, but put many altruists together and the group emerges as a stronger collective than a group of selfish individuals. From such work emerged a new group selection; see Price (1970). Kin selection fits very snuggly within this new group selection. They are not contradictory, but complementary, not the least because the concepts of benefits and costs in both theories differ. Kin selection talks about absolute costs and absolute benefits, whereas group selection talks about relative ones (relative between groups).

This is what should get accepted, either implicitly or explicitly. Group selection is still viewed as a bit of a taboo in some circles, but the thinking behind it as part of a multilevel selection framework is solid and few would have a problem with it, since it has evidence to back it up from all sides. What one needs to do is merely acknowledge that absolutism is wrong: not every social organism evolves exclusively by group selection or by kin selection or by individual selection. Not all adaptations that benefit the group evolved by group selection, and group selection is by itself not sufficient for the evolution of group adaptations. There are multiple causes, and all levels are interlinked. It was failure to recognise the multidimensionality of the problem that resulted in the group selection controversy we all know and hate. In philosophical terms, explanatory pluralism is the way to go, recognising that there can be multiple explanations for the same set of facts depending on the focus of your research (this is also a point I stressed in my natural selection lecture).

References:

Borrello. 2012. Evolutionary Restraints: The Contentious History of Group Selection.

Hamilton WD. 1964a. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 1-16.

Hamilton WD. 1964b. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 17-52.

Heinsohn R & Packer C. 1995. Complex cooperative strategies in group-territorial African lions. Science 269, 1260-1262.

Maynard Smith J. 1964. Group Selection and Kin Selection. Nature 201, 1145-1147.

Maynard Smith J. 1976. Group Selection. The Quarterly Review of Biology 51, 277-283.

Maynard Smith J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games.

Price G. 1970. Selection and Covariance. Nature 227, 520-521.

Sober E & Wilson DS. 1994. A Critical Review of Philosophical Work on the Units of Selection Problem. Philosophy of Science 61, 534-555.

Wade MJ. 1977. An Experimental Study of Group Selection. Evolution 31, 134-153.

Werfel J & Bar-Yam Y. 2004. The evolution of reproductive restraint through social communication. PNAS 101, 11019-11024.

Williams GC. 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection.





Much Ado About Randomness

6 04 2013

randomness in evolution

I’ve seen some fuss being made about this new book, Bonner’s Randomness in Evolution. It’s fairly incomprehensible to me why it’s seen as controversial, although I can guess at why there is confusion, besides the back blurb stoking the fires by saying it “challenges a central tenet of evolutionary biology”, which it doesn’t. In fact, from what I read so far, I consider it an essential book for the layman interested in getting a comprehensive view of evolution.

The popular narrative of evolution, as taught in schools and retold by most science popularisers, emphasises the role of natural selection, a process that, while dependent on randomness and chance to work, effectively eliminates their influence by streamlining evolution along deterministic pathways.

As I emphasised in my lecture linked above, natural selection is not the default rule in evolution. It’s not the null hypothesis. It’s a working hypothesis that needs heaps of supporting evidence for every examined case. Treating evolution as a phenomenon primarily under the force of natural selection is a risky road that leads to adaptationism, the misguided and thoroughly debunked idea that seeks to explain every single character and trait as an adaptation to something.

This misconception of evolution being practically synonymous with natural selection is one that I try very hard to scrub off my students’ minds. Evolution is an entire framework, and natural selection is just one process within it. Its power can be great indeed, but it’s not always active, and it’s not always all-powerful.

But if natural selection isn’t the default force of evolution, what is? As I explained in this pretty old post, the majority of mutations (the raw data for evolution) are neutral, having no effect whatsoever (or, a negligible one at best). Therefore, the assumption of neutrality is the default one to make.

Mutations are random events, for our intents and purposes here (there are certain biases, but that’s getting into irrelevant technicalities). Most of them are neutral, and these neutral mutations will get passed on to the offspring, and may eventually get fixed in the population. This is what we call genetic drift, true “random evolution”. There’s no need to get into the complex mathematics of this (it’s probably the most sophisticated maths you get in all of evolutionary theory); suffice it to say that genetic drift is undoubtably the most important process when it comes to evolution at the molecular level, as is corroborated by evidence from wild populations. Most of the variation in DNA between species is attributable not to natural selection, but to simple genetic drift. In fact, genetic drift is powerful enough that, in some cases, harmful mutations can get fixed in a population through it.

Where the view stops being so clear is when we zoom out and start looking at macroevolutionary features – anatomies, morphologies, behaviours, traits that are commonly referred to as adaptations. Again, even for such features that directly affect reproduction and survival, natural selection must be demonstrated, not assumed. The reason is that, like at the molecular level, morphological characters are not all identical. A population of elephants do not all have the same trunk length. The variations, however slight, fluctuate and most likely have a neutral effect – just like most mutations. They will get passed on and maybe fixed at random, not necessarily being selected for.

The point I’m making is that in evolutionary biology, there is absolutely nothing controversial with saying that evolution has a significant random component. The book’s contents in this regard do not challenge anything, and the slight controversy about it is incomprehensible. In fact, I will be recommending this book for those infected by ultra-Darwinian thought. (“Ultra-Darwinians” are those who view natural selection as a single all-powerful force in evolution.)

There is one point where the book does raise controversy: the author advances the hypothesis that organism size affects the degree of neutrality. I will not comment on this since I’m still not through. I only wanted to address the silly kerfuffle made about “randomness”.

On a sidenote, I suspect one other factor at play is that many people approach evolution from an anti-creationist point of view, having learned evolution by memorising creationist debunkings, and are reacting to the word “random” because creationists will often say that all of evolution is random. Which it isn’t, because natural selection is still there, and it’s by definition a deterministic process.





Phenotypic Plasticity

23 03 2013
Aschania levana, spring morph. © Manuel Valdueza

Araschnia levana, spring morph. © Manuel Valdueza

The nymphalid above, the map butterfly Araschnia levana, produces multiple generations each year. Its pupae come in two forms, dark and light, the difference arising from varying melanin concentrations. These differences persist in the adult. Above you see the adult that emerged from a light pupa; below is the adult from a dark pupa.

Aschania levana, summer morph. © David Short

Araschnia levana, summer morph. © David Short

This butterfly exhibits seasonal polyphenism: the orange morph emerges in spring, while the drab brown morph emerges in summer.

The eulophid wasp Melittoba chalybii is a parasitoid on bees and other wasps, laying eggs in the host for the larvae to feed on. Two forms of larva can be found in a parasitised victim. The first develops during the first 30 days after hatching, while the second takes 60-75 days to develop. This allows the larvae to best exploit their food source, allowing them to extract a very high nutrition:larva ratio, ultimately leading to more pupation and thus more adult parasitoids (see Mathews et al., 2009).

Both of these are examples of phenotypic plasticity. The appearance of the butterfly changes according to the seasons in order to better match the environment. In spring, the orange allows it to blend in well with flowers, giving it more camouflage and thus less predation risk. The environments that species find themselves in fluctuate between states of regularity. Winter is a time of short photoperiod, low temperatures, and less nutrition available; summer is the exact opposite. Spring and fall have their own intermediate properties. A species that has the ability to adapt to each of these special conditions by developing specific phenotypes obviously gains a distinct advantage, allowing it to exploit the conditions for its optimal survival.

More generally, phenotypic plasticity implies that a species has the ability to expand and conquer diverse environments, since its genotype is geared to adapting to different conditions. An insect’s ability to use a variety of host plants is one example of such plasticity, since it means an insect is not dependent on one specific plant that only grows in one environment – hency why phenotypic plasticity is important to consider, as invasive pests tend to be plastic.

Phenotypic plasticity can be expressed at any level. Morphological plasticity includes the Aschania above, or pond snails that develop spiny shells in the presence of predators. Life history plasticity is possible, as with deciduous trees who shed their leaves once specific environmental triggers are encountered – the trees experience a change in temperature or photoperiod, causing a cascade of biochemical changes, causing changing gene expression, which then leads to senescence in the leaves.

Phenotypic plasticity may just be incidental, as with the ability to use various host plants, or it can be selected for and hardwired as a beneficial trait, as with all the other examples I’ve used in this post. This is why phenotypic plasticity is an important factor to study in evolutionary ecology specifically, and evolutionary biology in general. Phenotypic plasticity in that sense merges into the debate on canalisation and the relationship between micro- and macroevolution that I’m interested in: is phenotypic plasticity the result of canalisation, or is it a component needed for increased evolvability? (That’s an excellent essay question for an evolution exam.)

Further Reading:

Gotthard K & Nylin S. 1995. Adaptive Plasticity and Plasticity as an Adaptation: A Selective Review of Plasticity in Animal Morphology and Life History. Oikos 74, 3-17.

Matthews RW, González JM, Matthews JR & Deyrup LD. 2009. Biology of the Parasitoid Melittobia (Hymenoptera: Eulophidae). Annual Review of Entomology 54, 251-266.

Nijhout HF. 2003. Development and evolution of adaptive polyphenisms. Evolution & Development 5, 9-18.

Van Asch M & Visser ME. 2007. Phenology of Forest Caterpillars and Their Host Trees: The Importance of Synchrony. Annual Review of Entomology 52, 37-55.





Lamarckism, The First Theory of Evolution

4 03 2013

These are the slides from a lecture I gave on Lamarckism last week, along with explanatory text. It goes through the intellectual precedents of Lamarckism, an explanation of Lamarckism, how it fares against natural selection, and an outline of its history. Here’s a PDF version.

img1

Lamarckism may have been the first comprehensive theory of evolution, but it wasn’t invented out of thin air by Lamarck. As with any theory, it’s founded on thoughts and principles already found in scientific circles of the time. With Lamarckism, the two most important pre-existing thoughts were the idea of the scala naturae, and the idea that species could change in different environments.

The scala naturae, the “great chain of being”, is an idea that can be traced back to Aristotle and probably before, and is basically a hierarchical classification system whereby those at the bottom of the hierarchy are the simplest organisms and those at the top are the most complex. Imagery based on it is still way too common and its influence is still pervasive in bad evolution popularisation – the ideas that evolution has a direction or that humans are the pinnacle of evolution are direct descendants of the scala naturae. The classical scala naturae is fairly similar to that presented on the right: the four elements at the bottom, then metals, salts and rocks, then mosses and plants, then insects, then seashells, then reptiles, then fish, then birds, then quadrupeds, then humans. In less scientifically-minded texts, humans would be followed by angels and, of course, God.

Scala naturae source: Bonnet C. 1745. Traité d’Insectologie.Vol. 1.

Ideas that species could change somehow were quite common in the early 19th century – this was not Lamarck’s breakthrough. For example, Buffon, his mentor, pioneered his own ideas about this, although all these concepts were rather vague.

img2Lamarck himself had a somewhat torturous road to academia, having served well in the army before being discharged, and going on to study four years of medicine before being dissuaded by his brother. He became an understudy of leading French naturalist Bernard de Jussieu, concentrating on botany and, in 1978, publishing a three-volume compendium of the French flora that was impressive enough to attract Buffon, who took him under his wing and got him a position at the French Academy of Sciences and the royal botanical gardens. The aftermath of the French Revolution was a reforming of the gardens into the National Museum of Natural History in 1793, in which he gained the position of invertebrate professor (despite this not being his specialty), a position he held until his death.

Biographical information aside, Lamarck is most famous for Lamarckian evolution (although, as we will see, what we nowadays call Lamarckism is actually neo-Lamarckism). Besides this, we take many of his advances for gratned – the word “biology” is his invention, as are the now-ubiquitous systematic categories of “vertebrate”, “invertebrate”, “insect”, “crustacean”, “arachnid”, “echinoderm”, and “annelid”. So do not think that he’s just some wacky naturalist of the past who is now completely discredited: some of his work does still live on.

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Anyway, our topic here is Lamarckism, his milestone idea about evolution that he outlined in three of his publications. He first came to think about such things while sorting through Bruguière‘s collection of fossil and extant molluscs at the Natural History Museum – he was the previous curator of invertebrates and died. Lamarck realised that the fossil molluscs and the extant ones are analogous, and by plotting their distribution in time, he could trace a direct lineage from the ancestral species to the recent ones. This triggered the rest of the thoughts, which he first exposed in his 1801 book, Recherches sur l’Organisation des Corps Vivants.

But the real explanations details of the evolutionary process came in what is considered his magnum opus, 1809′s Philosophie Zoologique. 1815 saw the release of the first volume of his new invertebrate textbook series, Histoire Naturelle des Animaux Sans Vertèbres, where he also provides a summary of Lamarckism.

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I already said that Lamarck was highly-influenced by ideas already floating around, especially that of the great chain of beings. Lamarckism takes the idea of progression as its first core foundation – organisms can be classified from simplest to most complex, and evolve in that direction.

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However, Lamarck went further than his contemporaries by trying to postulate a mechanism for this progression, rather than taking it for granted. He proposed that animal life has some sort of endowment built into it, an inherent ability to become more complex, and that would explain the presence of a natural hierarchical classification.

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This natural complexification can thus best be pictured not as a climb up a ladder, but by the species staying static on an escalator. The axis naturally carries the species up an axis of complexity – it’s just a matter of time for the species to transform from a simple morphology to a complex one.

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But if you think about it – as Lamarck did, of course – you would realise that there is a theory-breaking problem with this proposition of an automatic, linear progression. It’s the classic creationist argument: if we evolved from monkeys, why are monkeys still around? If this is a linear progression, then they should already be human.

This is solved by saying that biogenesis – the formation of new life – is constantly happening. In other words, there are many escalators (one for each category of life), and each one represents a different starting point. Humans are the oldest organisms, and “worms” (they still lumped the Vermes all together back then) are among the youngest, given their apparent simplicity.

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But there is also a second problem, one of scale. A hierarchical classification that goes something like worm-fish-reptile-bird-mammal-primate-human can be somehow justified by the standards of of the day.

Now pick one category from those, the mammal for example. You have rodents, bats, canids, felines, cetaceans, ungulates, pinnipeds. Making a sensible hierarchy out of these may be possible.

Now choose on ofe these categories, for example the felines. You have house cats, bobcats, ocelots, lions, tigers, pumas, leopards. At this point, making a hierarchy becomes an exercise in senseless futility, and Lamarck recognised this, and this is where the most famous part of Lamarckism comes in as an explanatory mechanism: the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

It must be noted, though, that the inheritance of acquired characteristics is not Lamarck’s original idea and was very widespread, although he did (unsuccessfully, as we will see) expand it with his own original additions.

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Inheritance of acquired characteristics is a fairly simple concept (at least it is if you forget all you know about modern biology, as you’re supposed to do when examining history of science). I will explain Lamarck’s version using the usual example of the giraffe.

So the giraffe is living in a savannah where the trees are growing taller. This induces a besoin (= “need“, not “want” as is usually wrongly translated) in the giraffe, and it changes its behaviour to be able to reach the taller branches. For example, it would extend its neck more. According to Lamarck, this extra use of the neck would cause the neck to grow through the flow of more vital fluid. This new neck state is an acquired characteristic, and it can be passed on to the offspring, hence why we speak of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

The opposite is also true: if an organ is disused, then vital fluid will flow out of it and it will atrophy. This explains why cave animals have reduced eyes, for example.

Giraffe source: gmacfadyen

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Another example Lamarck used, just for your interest, is the membrane between the digits of many swimming animals, like frogs, sea turtles, otters, and beavers. By swimming more, the animal has a need to push water out of the way, and so the interdigital membrane gets used as a paddle, causing more vital fluid to flow into it.

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The key novelty in Lamarck’s concept of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was the invocation of vital fluid. The real ruckus here isn’t much any physiological discovery (vital fluid or anything close to it has never been discovered). Instead, it’s the completely naturalistic and mechanistic view that postulating something like vital fluid espouses, and it was fairly controversial at the time. One the social side, it was controversial because it does away with any need for a God guiding evolution (although, as we will see later, theologians did a complete U-turn when Darwin came into the picture!). And the concept of such a dynamic system went against the predominant view of the time that while organisms may change, they only change in preset ways – “there is an optimal phenotype for each environment. How it gets there, we don’t know, but vital fluid isn’t it” would have been the reaction of the typical naturalist of the time.

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So, to summarise, there are two foundational principles of Lamarckism. The first is the idea of a natural, linear progression along a scale of complexity. However, as the diversity of life demonstrates, there is a confounding factor leading to large meanders on the way to perfection: organisms will adapt to their local environments, leading to a diversity of forms even at the same level of complexity.

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So, now that we know what Lamarckism is all about, we can get back to the modern age and look at it critically, starting with what he got correct.

Any philosopher of science or thesis advisor will tell you that identifying the correct problems and asking the right questions is half the step towards good science. And in that respect, Lamarck excelled: he successfully figured out the four core problems of natural history of the time:

  1. Why are fossil forms different than extant ones?

  2. Why are some organisms more complex than others?

  3. Why is there so much diversity?

  4. Why are organisms well-suited to their environment?

img21But beyond that, he failed at providing any correct explanation – although it must be stressed that it was not through any fault of his own. If any of us (or Chucky) were alive at the time and working with the same material, we most probably would have converged on a similar set of ideas, and not on natural selection or mutationism.

Lamarck said that fossil forms are different because they always get replaced by the more complex ones as the lineage goes up the escalator of complexity. We now know that fossil forms are on a different part of a phylogeny and hence are different.

There is no such thing as a scale of complexity; complex traits arise in individual taxa as a result of their unique circumstances. Most typical examples of complexity, e.g. multicellularity, are unique phenomena that are in no way indicative of pervasive trends.

Diversity is not a product of constant biogenesis; all the evidence points to a single origin of life. Diversity is a result of speciation.

There is no such thing as vital fluid. Organisms are seemingly well-suited to their environment because the organisms that we see have made it through the unforgiving grinder of natural selection. It’s a perceptory illusion more than anything else, really.

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In natural selection as understood today, you consider a whole population of giraffes with variable neck sizes. Those with the taller necks will be able to reach higher tree branches and thus have access to more food. This gives them more energy and thus a slight advantage in reproduction, meaning that in the long run, they will produce more offspring. Assuming a genetic basis to neck length, this means that more offspring with taller necks are likely to be born, meaning that they will outcompete the shorter-necked ones over many generations.

In Lamarckism, the giraffe needs to reach taller trees and so its neck lengthens, and that longer neck gets passed on to the offspring.

It’s obvious to us now that this, the second core of Lamarckism, fails.

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The idea of a progression up a scale of complexity fails even on a molecular level, as the entire basis of molecular evolution shows. Motoo Kimura and Tomoko Ohta are the founders of the dominant neutral and nearly-neutral theories of molecular evolution, respectively. What they show is that mutations are overwhelmingly neutral – they have no effect on the fitness of an organism; nerly-neutral theory expands this a bit by saying that many of these neutral mutations will have an effect that is too tiny to really be noticeable. The rest of the mutations are deleterious, with only a small amount of mutations actually being beneficial.

If there was a preset linear progression to perfection, then we would expect all mutations to be advantageous, and that’s just not corroborated by any evidence.

Diagram source: Bromham L & Penny D. 2003. The modern molecular clock. Nature Reviews Genetics 4, 216-224.

The bit at the bottom of the slide snuck in because I co-opted this slide from my natural selection lecture. It’s not really relevant here, go to that post to see what it’s all about.

img25So we now know that Lamarckism is false, but it hasn’t always been this way. A full coverage of the history of Lamarckism would require a lecture/post all on its own, so this is just a broad look.

The idea of vital fluids never really took off, and thus Lamarckism – and evolution – remained contested until Darwin’s Origin of Species took the world by storm. Darwin showed the reality of evolution, but hadn’t managed to bring everyone on board with natural selection.

The idea of inherited acquired traits (IAT) which had been present (and even used by Darwin in his thoughts on social evolution) became synonymised with Lamarckism, and a whole host of neo-Lamarckisms with IAT at their core sprung up to counter natural selection. In scientific circles, these neo-Lamarckisms generally won out over natural selection. Outside of science, a curious thing happened: theology, which half a century ago was fervently opposed to Lamarckism, now endorsed it fully – only because Lamarckism, gutted of vital fluids and only retaining IATs, could easily be endowed with the action of a creative deity intelligently designing adaptations, much more comfortable than the supposed “randomness” of natural selection (these people were never that bright).

In 1900, both the neo-Lamarckists and the selectionists got beaten down by the rediscovery of genetics and the evolutionary movement that arose therefrom: mutationism. The three movements were at odds with each other. The difference betweent he three are what they stress as the dominant force in evolution: mutations (mutationism), natural selection (selectionism), IAT (neo-Lamarckism).

By 1910, the neo-Lamarckisms had started their decline, with Weismannism gaining more prominence. Weismannism is pure selectionism, what we now would term ultra-Darwinism. It generally became a two-dog race between mutationism and selectionism, which endured until the 1930s, when the Modern Synthesis began to get crafted – the Modern Synthesis, completed in the 1950s, was basically a fusion of mutationism and selectionism, with a heap of other stuff added to the mix. None of that other stuff included neo-Lamarckism, which had by then well and truly died.

At least it was so in the European and American academias. In Russia, a radically different story was unfolding, one of the dark chapters of the history of biology and of science in general: lysenkoism. Trofim Lysenko was a so-so scientist with very high political acumen. He used the latter to rise to the top of Soviet biological academia and became head of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences by the 1930s. And there, he began a dictatorship where he imposed his own idea of evolution – michurinism, rebranded neo-Lamarckism – and executed those geneticists who did not agree with this stance. Michurinism became the “new biology”, well-suited to collectivization and communism – there was a very heavy mixing of politics with the (non-existent) science, no doubt because Lysenko was Stalin’s little lap dog. The spread of Lysenkoism is also directly tied to the failure of Soviet collectivization and all the associated agricultural crises, because that’s just what you get when you base your country’s agricultural system on disproven theories. Lysenkoism went away officially in 1964, although strands of it remained for a couple of decades afterwards. Now it’s remembered as a blotch on the history of Russia and Russian science.

So, now, all Lamarckisms and neo-Lamarckisms are dead. However, the rise of epigenetics has led to a burgeoning and, in my opinion, misguided movement of neo-neo-Lamarckism (they get referred to as neo-Lamarckists, but that’s wrong, since neo-Lamarckism refers to the Lamarckisms of the 1860s-1930s). It bears little resemblance to the Lamarckism of yore, and postulates that epigenetic modifications – environmentally-induced changes to DNA and gene regulation that really require their own post – are an important driving force in evolution.

I don’t quite see their argument for the simple reason that epigenetic modifications must be made in germ cells to be passed on to the offspring (although internally-brooding organisms can also modify the environment of the womb to induce epigenetic changes in the developing fetus). So, for example, a snail that develops spines in response to predators in the water will not pass these spines on to its offspring automatically. What will get passed on is the capability to develop spines in the same situation… but this is regular heredity which doesn’t need any fancy neo-neo-Lamarckism to explain.

It’s my job, so I will keep an open mind about this – there may be cases where epigenetics does indeed play an important role in evolution. I just haven’t seen them yet. I do see epigenetics as important for ecology though, so that may be a more viable bridge for neo-neo-Lamarckists to attempt to build.

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For books on Lamarckism, I recommend these two:

Burkhardt Jr.’s 1977 The Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology goes over Lamarckism, and is the best overview you can wish for.

For more on the battles between neo-Lamarckism, selectionism, and mutationism, see Bowler’s classic 1992 study in the history of evolution, The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Evolution Theories in the Decades Around 1900.





Polyandry

22 02 2013
Phalarope, by Ken Schneider. Click for source.

Phalarope, by Ken Schneider. Click for source.

The phalarope female stands in front of a smaller male and guards him from other wandering females until he can mate. When she lays her eggs, she leaves him and finds another male to mate with.

The phalarope is one of the many animals (Gowaty, 1994) that exhibits polyandry – a mating system where one female courts many males. It suits the phalarope because of the characteristics of their mating: the mating season is short, there is a substantial predation risk in the breeding grounds, and the hatchlings can feed and take care of themselves relatively quickly, so there is no need for both parents to stay in order to ensure reproductive success.

Polyandrous species can be compared through their degree of polyandry, how many mates a female will have. The phalarope has a handful of males, while some honeybee queens will mate with over 50 drones (Moritz et al., 1995).

The fact that the female will mate with multiple males is known, and so the individual male will often try any trick to make sure it’s his sperm that fertilises the eggs. In many arthropods, this involves depositing a mating plug. Take the polyandrous bumblebee Bombus terrestris as an example. Mating typically lasts over 30 minutes by force – the male grips so tightly that removing him artificially will cause his penis to be ripped off – even though the sperm is ejaculated within the first two minutes (Duvoisin et al., 1999). Not only does the male ejaculate a lot more sperm than necessary or useful for the female (Baer, 2003), he uses the rest of the time to plug the female’s vaginal opening with a gelatinous cocktail that will dissolve away within 3 days – so while the female can mate within those three days, other males’ sperm will have trouble going through the plug. The timespan until the plug solidifies is also coincidentally the same timespan it takes the sperm to travel to the spermatheca, where it’s stored for use in fertilisation.

Types of polyandry:

Polyandry comes in various forms with self-explanatory names:

  • Convenience polyandry: Instead of expending energy to resist fighting unwanted matings, the females just lay down and take it.
  • Fraternal polyandry: Male brothers mate with one female.
  • Genetic-benefit polyandry: In female arthropods that can store sperm, the female will mate with multiple males in order to have a diverse sperm pool, and thus more genetic diversity, to fertilise her eggs with.
  • Mate-defence polyandry: As in the phalarope, where the female guards her multiple male mates.
  • Maternal-benefit polyandry: In which females mate with multiple males due to benefits given by sexually-active males, usually nutrition or protection.
  • Serial (sequential) polyandry: In which females form monogamous pairs with multiple males in succession.
  • Simultaneous polyandry: Similar to serial polyandry, but forms the pairs at the same time.
  • Sperm-replenishment polyandry: In which females mate with multiple males to refill their sperm banks (see genetic-benefit polyandry).

Evolution of polyandry:

While essential, mating is pretty risky business, especially for females: they lose energy, they are more conspicuous to predators, they may get infected by a sexually-transmitted parasite, and there may be injury involved (accidental or purposeful). In many species, the ejaculate or the mating plug contains toxic chemicals that reduce the female’s lifespan (Wigby & Chapman, 2005). So, polyandrous mating must bring about some hefty benefits in order for these to pay off.

At the individual female’s level, the benefit may come simply from not having to resist mating with males (Arnqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2005). In some species, females also get direct, material benefits from mating rituals. Males of many insects offer nutritious nuptial gifts which have been shown to increase the female’s fecundity (Arnqvist & Nilsson, 2000); and there is always the free protein earned by cannibalistic females. Males may also protect their females from predators or aggressive conspecifics (Arnqvist & Nilsson, 2000).

In cases where parental care is important, polyandry brings a distinct benefit by allowing parenthood to be split among many males, as seen in fairy wrens and other cooperative breeding birds. This is especially important in birds, where doing too many parental duties is associated with dying younger and thus missing out on reproductive cycles (Liker & Székely, 2005). However, it should also be noted that when too many males have been mated with, those males will each invest less care as there is too little benefit in caring for what is unlikely to be your offspring (Kokko & Jennions, 2008).

Polyandry also allows the female to choose who fathers the children by storing sperm, allowing her to choose “good genes”, or to keep trying to get better mates but always have a backup just in case (Watson, 1991). The benefit derived from females influencing patternity is now not believed to be so large (Hettyey et al., 2010), but it does play a supporting role. Polyandry is also a prerequisite for sperm competition, which does result in better genes getting passed on.

However, whether all the above benefits truly outweigh the substantial costs of multiple matings is not generalisable, and depends on the situation of every species. For example, Brown et al. (2004) conclusively find that in laboratory-bred Drosophila melanogaster, none of these benefits are found. Evans & Marshall (2005) found that they clearly exist in the sea urchin Heliocidaris erythrogramma. Same goes for guppies (Evans & Magurran, 2000). So, basically, it has to be studies on a species-by-species basis. Alternatively, it may not be a species-specific characteristic, but one determined by specific environmental factors, as eviudenced by the fact that even within species, levels of polyandry may differ (Ridley, 1988).

At a population genetic level, polyandry also has many benefits. It increases the genetic diversity of the offspring, rendering the population more resilient overall. This is especially important in eusocial and colonial animals, where higher genetic diversity results in less parasitic and pathogenic infections (Tooby, 1982). Polyandry is thus naturally selected for from a genetic point of view, and indirectly selected for from an ecological point of view. But whether these genetic benefits actually play a role in the ecological theatre is debatable – they’re clearly sensible from an evolutionary theory standpoint, but whether this is always relevant to mating choices isn’t clear (Maklakov & Arnqvist, 2009); see Firman & Simmons (2008) for an example where they are relevant. One must also keep in mind that examining everything from the gene’s point of view is just one possible framework, albeit a practical one (see the latter parts of my natural selection post).

Polyandry in humans:

Humans do not have a single mating system, with environment and society dictating our mating system. Biologically, we’re polygamous, but this has widely been socially and culturally subverted into monogamous pair-bonding, and socialisation can make humans mate in all imaginable ways – there are polygynous cultures, polyandrous cultures, monogamous cultures, polyamorous cultures, and in many cases, these aren’t really set – a monogamous culture/society can have polyandrous members (and vice versa in all permutations).

Beall & Goldstein (1981) describe one of the more celebrated cases of human polyandry, fraternal polyandry in Tibet. But even there, the polyandry is only done by high-status families – those who own land – and a strict hierarchy is present where the younger brothers are subordinate to the older ones. The rest of the tribe is monogamous and, from an evolutionary perspective, the members of the monogamous unions are at a distinct advantage since monogamous the males have a higher chance of passing on their genes to the next generation than the males in the polyandrous union.

The advantage of polyandry there is that it maintains the resources of the land that is owned within the family group. This is important, because Tibet isn’t really a productive landscape, and so having this closely-knit family raises the living standard – it’s more efficient than each brother getting a separate wife, and then having the land get separated into smaller estates, eventually resulting in strife.

Two other societies are recognised as polyandrous, and both are also fraternal polyandries. The Kandyans of Sri Lanka are the opposite of the Tibetans: here, it’s the poorer families that are polyandrous, with two brothers marrying the same woman. It’s the same in the Lepcha of northern India, where brothers marry the same woman. In both cases, it’s because the land is so poor that it takes more than two adults to produce enough food to sustain a family.

References:

Arnqvist G & Kirkpatrick M. 2005. The Evolution of Infidelity in Socially Monogamous Passerines: The Strength of Direct and Indirect Selection on Extrapair Copulation Behavior in Females. The American Naturalist 165, 26-37.

Arnqvist G & Nilsson T. 2000. The evolution of polyandry: multiple mating and female fitness in insects. Animal Behaviour 60, 145-164.

Baer B. 2003. Bumblebees as model organisms to study male sexual selection in social insects. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 54, 521-533.

Beall CM & Goldstein MC. 1981. Tibetan Fraternal Polyandry: A Test of Sociobiological Theory. American Anthropologist 83, 5-12.

Brown WD, Bjork A, Scneider K & Pitnick S. 2004. No evidence that polyandry benefits females in drosophila melanogaster. Evolution 58, 1242-1250.

Duvoisin N, Baer B & Schmid-Hempel P. 1999. Sperm transfer and male competition in a bumblebee. Animal Behaviour 58, 743-749.

Evans JP & Magurran AE. 2000. Multiple benefits of multiple mating in guppies. PNAS 97, 10074-10076.

Evans JP & Marshall DJ. 2005. Male-by-female interactions influence fertilization success and mediate the benefits of polyandry in the sea urchin heliocidaris erythrogramma. Evolution 59, 106-112.

Firman RC & Simmons LW. 2008. Polyandry, sperm competition, and reproductive success in mice. Behavioral Ecology 19, 695-702.

Gowaty PA. 1994. Architects of sperm competition. TrEE 9, 160-162.

Hettyey A, Hegyi G, Puurtinen M, Hoi H, Török J & Penn DJ. 2010. Mate Choice for Genetic Benefits: Time to Put the Pieces Together. Ethology 116, 1-9.

Kokko H & Jennions MD. 2008. Parental investment, sexual selection and sex ratios. Journal of Evolutionary Biology 21, 919-948.

Liker A & Székely T. 2005. Mortality costs of sexual selection and parental care in natural populations of birds. Evolution 59, 890-897.

Maklakov AA & Arnqvist G. 2009. Testing for Direct and Indirect Effects of Mate Choice by Manipulating Female Choosiness. Current Biology 19, 1903-1906.

Moritz RFA, Kryger P, Koeniger G, Koeniger N, Estoup A & Tingek S. 1995. High degree of polyandry in Apis dorsata queens detected by DNA microsatellite variability. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 37, 357-363.

Ridley M. 1988. Mating frequency and fecundity in insects. Biological Reviews 63, 509-549.

Tooby J. 1982. Pathogens, polymorphism, and the evolution of sex. Journal of Theoretical Biology 97, 557-576.

Watson PJ. 1991. Multiple paternity as genetic bet-hedging in female sierra dome spiders, Linyphia litigiosa (Linyphiidae). Animal Behaviour 41, 343-360.

Wigby S & Chapman T. 2005. Sex Peptide Causes Mating Costs in Female Drosophila melanogaster. Current Biology 15, 316-321.








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